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Dr. Ka tar zy na
Sto kło sa, ge bo ren
1974  in Bar tos zy -
ce ( Po len ). Wis -
sen schaft li che
Mit ar bei te rin  am
Han nah - A rendt -
In sti tut  für To ta li -
ta ris mus for schung
an  der  TU Dres -
den ( An schrift :
01062 Dres den ).
Stu di um  der Kul -
tur wis sen schaf ten  an  der Eu ro pa - U ni ver si tät
Via dri na  in Frank furt ( Oder ). 2002 Pro mo ti -
on  zum  Dr.  phil.  an  der Eu ro pa - U ni ver si tät
Via dri na.  Von 2003–2004 Lei te rin  der Ar -
beits stel le Ost mit tel eu ro pa  in  der Deut schen
Ge sell schaft  für Aus wär ti ge Po li tik ( DGAP )
in Ber lin.
Ab stract
Polen muss te  im Lau fe  der Ge schich te im -
mer wie der  um sei ne Frei heit kämp fen :
zuerst  nach  den Tei lun gen  und  der na tio na -
len Wie der be grün dung 1918,  dann wäh rend
des Zwei ten Welt krie ges  und schließ lich
wäh rend  der kom mu nis ti schen Herr schaft.
Bei  der Wie der er lan gung sei ner Un ab hän -
gig keit 1918  wie 1989 stan den  die Ver ei nig -
ten Staa ten  von Ame ri ka  im Ver ständ nis Po -
lens Pa te.  Das führ te  zur Ent ste hung ei nes
My thos  und  zur Idea li sie rung  der  USA  in
Po len.  Der Bei trag un ter sucht  das Frei heits -
ver ständ nis  in  der pol ni schen Be völ ke rung,
ver gleicht  die ame ri ka ni schen  und pol ni -
schen Wer te mit ei nan der und be han delt ab -
schlie ßend  die Wahr neh mung  der  USA  in
Po len.
“Freedom” and “liberty” are the two central socio - political terms, which
Americans constantly refer to. In the USA the discovery of freedom is deemed to
be “a very special, unique, marvellous American gift to humanity.”1 While the
word “freedom” is of Germanic - Celtic origin and refers to an affiliation with the
community of the free, e.g. the tribe, “liberty” is derived from the ancient
Roman tradition and originally refers to a high degree of personal independence
in a hierarchically structured society. From the Polish perspective America has
been a synonym of “freedom” for a long time. At the present the values of “liber-
ty” are accentuated above all. Recently, since the beginning of the Second Gulf
War Poland is perceived within Europe as a country between Europe and the
USA. The American life style affects Polish political, economical and everyday
life. This is connected to the Polish freedom movement and the Polish - American
relations in the past on the one hand and the current security - concept at the time
on the other.
In an interview the former Polish foreign minister, Włodzimierz Cimosze -
wicz, pointed out that he liked the “enthusiasm of the Americans, and the fact
that they don’t complain much”.2 This view of America is very widespread in
Poland. Especially the freedom of thought and action in everyday life is highly es-
teemed by the Polish people. In Polish public opinion the United States are seen
as a country of great opportunities, opportunities which were inaccessible to the
Polish people for a long time, especially freedom and wealth.3
How do the Poles perceive the American “freedom” and “liberty” ? How deep
is the Poles’ knowledge of the United States ? Does this fascination relate to an
economic model, which they would like to adopt themselves ? In this article I will
try to explain the pro - American attitude of the Poles in connection to the tradi-
tion of freedom.
The perception of the United States in the Polish society
The Poles associate the USA with the following terms : wealth, great power, war
(11th September ), hard work, a well developed economy, ally, freedom and
democracy.4 The table 1 summarises the answers in percentage to the question :
What do you connect with the United States ?
A study carried out in January 2003 by the Warsaw based opinion research in-
stitute CBOS revealed that 58 % of the Polish people perceived the Americans to
be likable, 26 % of the respondents were indifferent towards the Americans,
while only 12 % experienced feelings of dislike towards them. These results place
the American people at the top of the Polish likeability rankings. Compared with
results obtained in 1999 their popularity even grew by 4 %. In February 2003 a
slim majority of 51 % were critical of the support the Polish government offered
to the United States in connection with the war in Iraq. The Polish government
had, along with several other nations, officially backed US actions in the form of
the so - called “Letter of the Eight” and sent the troops into Iraq.5 A special
emphasis must be placed on the fact that only 25 % of those questioned categor-
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Terms Attributes Percentage
wealth wealth, prosperity 33.5
superpower, force superpower, force, big, a big country,enormity 29.7
war/aggression
war, 11th September, aggression/
interference, hegemony/domination,
power, World Policeman, NATO
25.4
economy work, technology, dollar, money, economy, capitalism 11.8
the Polish perspective ally, friend, partner, assistance, thecountry of dreams, “It is better.” 9.3
other characteristics democracy, freedom, opportunities, tolerance 7.1
Table 1 : Perception of the United States in the Polish society
Source : Michael Fleischer, Europa, Niemcy, USA i Rosja w polskim systemie kultury [ Euro 
pe, Germany, USA and Russia in the Polish Culture System ], Wrocław 2004, p. 127.
ically opposed this act, while 26 % strongly disagreed. 29 % of the Polish respon-
dents supported the action of their government and 20 % had no definite opin-
ion on this topic.6
The majority of the Polish public (52 %) sees no contradiction between a well
functioning cooperation with the USA and integration in the European Union.
This conviction is spread widely among politically active population. 46 % of the
supporters of Poland’s accession to the EU believe that Poland should cooperate
very closely with the USA. A year before the EU enlargement Polish public opin-
ion did not see any inconsistency between a more intensive cooperation with the
United States and a consolidation of the European integration. The majority
wished that the European Union were founded on close cooperation with the
USA.7
Polish Myths of America
The great geographical distance between Poland and the United States assists
the formation of myths. The myth of American wealth was always extremely wide
spread in Poland. Over time this myth took on different shapes and meanings.
Initially these impressions had an exotic and fairy tail character. America was
portrayed as a land full of treasures and gold mountains. In time gold was re-
placed by the dollar, which then became the myth of American wealth. At the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, i.e. the era of emigration from Poles to the
United States in search of work, the myth of the dollar was particularly preva-
lent. In Poland the USA was constantly connected to progress and modernity.
The American advertisement and pop culture, which was also wide spread in
Poland, greatly enhanced this image. 
One of the most important American legends was the myth of freedom,
democracy and a liberal society. Already in the first years after her independence
North America was a harbour for those, who were rejected by other societies, for
both criminals and victims of discrimination. During the periods, in which
Poland was not sovereign, American freedom and democracy were primarily
viewed from a political angle. The USA was a sovereign and independent state,
whose leaders were democratically elected. Following a short period of freedom
after 1918 Poland once more lost her independence and initially found herself
under German rule followed by Soviet rule. In particularly during the Soviet pe-
riod American freedom and democracy had a special meaning for Poland.
The United States were regarded as the land, where everyone had equal
wealth and the same chances, where hard work and not the luck of birth deter-
mined the worth of a person. This was the greatest American myth, i.e. the myth
of American success, to which everyone no matter their descent had equal access
to. This myth originated in the Puritan religion, according to which a hard work-
ing life is rewarded by God in the form of wealth. Wealth illustrated God’s benev-
olence and poverty the absence of it. In Poland it was emphasised that the
chance of wealth in America was offered to everyone, who was willing to try for
it and not only for a certain class of millionaire. The impression of the USA as
the land, which gives everyone a chance to realise themselves and to live in rela-
tive wealth was always common in Poland. This constitutes the Polish idea of
Paradise. After the fall of Communism the USA became an example for the Poles
to emulate and the American dream could be realised on the banks of the
Vistula.8
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Historical reasons
“The most important thing is life. And where there is life, the most important
thing is freedom. And there is no freedom without democracy”.9 These words
were said by Marek Edelman, a survivor of the Holocaust and opponent of the
Polish Communist dictatorship, on the 25th anniversary of the Polish freedom
movement Solidarność ( Solidarity ).
The freedom movement in Poland has a long tradition. Its development is
connected to the creation of a modern national consciousness, which began even
before the country was annexed by its neighbours through the three successive
partitions after 1773. Polish immigrants’ participation in the American war of in-
dependence turned America into a model for Polish freedom fighters. The Polish
Constitution of May 3rd 1791 and Kościusko’s Manifesto of Połaniec became the
essential ingredients of the Polish national narrative. Thus, the independence of
Poland was perceived to be necessary, both as a national process and as a politi-
cal, individual process. For the Polish insurgents, who in the nineteenth century
fought against Russian despotism, an independent state was only one of many
dreams : they also wanted a state with all the democratic liberties they believed
Americans enjoyed.
Polish national narratives of freedom became attached to views of the past,
which were of very different origins. The old traditions of the Polish noble repub-
lic united with the new heroic tales of resistance provided material to form the
historical consciousness of the nation. When, after the First World War a new
Polish state arose from the ashes of the conflict, the idea of freedom was an im-
portant part of its political culture. Even during the era of Józef Piłsudski’s au-
thoritarian system the myth of America as the land of freedom survived.
Polish immigrants to the USA played an important role in the Polish percep-
tion of America. Within the Polish society a myth emerged, according to which
America was deemed a “Paradise on Earth”, a land of unlimited possibilities,
where everyone could succeed if he only wanted to. 
In Chicago, New York, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee and other cities Polish -
American press, a Polish theatre and Polish literature developed to a vast ex-
tent.10 Polish settlements in the United States became particularly numerous af-
ter 1848, when in Europe’s “Springtime of Nations” the veterans of a succession
of failed Polish insurrections against foreign rule fled to the United States. Polish
emigration to the United States increased as a result of the gradual capitalist
transformation and the modernisation of the Polish countryside after 1850.
Between 1850 and 1920 2.5 million ethnic Poles ( including regional subgroups )
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left for the USA.11 After the First World War between 2.25 and 3.0 million Poles
resided in the USA and from 1919 to 1939 approximately 284,000 inhabitants
of Poland settled in the USA. They arrived directly from Poland. However, also a
re - emigration from the USA back to Poland occurred, mainly in the period 1919
to 1939. During this period 125,000 Poles re - emigrated from the USA to Po -
land. The main reasons for this decision were the hope to be able to regain
Polish liberty after the First World War followed by the wish to help the home-
land during the Polish - Russian war. During the Communist era Poles did not re-
turn from the USA.12
After the Second World War new waves of Polish immigrants reshaped the
Polish minority in the United States. Between 1945 and 1990 approximately
368,000 political exiles and displaced persons arrived in the United States. The
political immigrants were primarily searching for freedom in the USA.13
The Polish immigration to the USA during the First World War as well as the
emigration and re - emigration in the following decades contributed to the devel-
opment of the United States’ image in Poland. Personal experiences gained
while living in the USA became the Poles’ collective experiences.14
Poland and the United States first established diplomatic relations in 1919
during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. In Woodrow Wilson’s “14 Point
Program” the thirteenth point concerned the reestablishment of Polish inde-
pendence. The myth of Wilson as a great ally of Poland was based on this foun-
dation. Therefore, Polish children learned at school that Poland owed the return
of independence to US President Woodrow Wilson and to the Versailles Peace
Treaty. Indeed, many academics of political science and journalists see the chain
of events, which took place in 1919, as one of the most important roots of the
current Polish pro - Atlanticism. It is often forgotten that the president also made
critical statements about Poland and Polish immigrants in the USA.15
Herbert C. Hoover was also of great importance for the Poles. He was at the
head of the American Relief Administration ( ARA ), which between 1919 and
1922 uninterruptedly provided Poland with material aid.16 In his journals from
the years 1874–1929 Hoover dedicated many words to Poland.17
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During the Second World War American values, including freedom, were
broadcast to the front through American media such as the radio station “Voice
of America”. The influence of American radio programs on the world view of
the Poles increased during the Cold War. At the beginning of the nineteen - eight-
ies “Voice of America”, “Radio Free Europe” and other smaller radio stations
were heard by 70 % of all Polish radio owners.18
The tragedies of the Second World War and that Poland became a Communist
dictatorship after the war, gave the notion of freedom even more importance
than ever before for the Poles. The new Communist state was seen by the people
as a half - sovereign country and the lack of liberties was all too evident not to be
perceived. In such times the idea of freedom became a value in itself, which the
growing opposition, even from the right side of the political spectrum, accepted
as a given fact. The reminder of President Wilson’s pro - Polish attitude and the
myth of American and Western style freedom provided the opposition with a
model for a political alternative to Communism.
The Communist propaganda against the United States nevertheless had a
counterproductive effect : “the Poles longed for American Liberty, which was for-
bidden and therefore attractive”.19 After the relaxation in 1956 American institu-
tions and media were also present in Communist Poland. Since 1959 the maga-
zine America, which was published in Poland by the United States Information
Agency ( USIA ) and quite clearly produced a positive image of America, was on
sale. It is interesting that this medium was not effected by censoring and was sold
by many newsagents. All together during the Cold War the average Polish reader
had much easier access to American literature than readers in many other coun-
tries within the Soviet Block. The number of American titles constantly in-
creased. The Polish public was even familiar with American films. 366 American
films were brought to Poland between 1945–1963. American art and music
were present in Polish everyday life, with the exception of the period between
1947–1956 and after the introduction of the state of war on 13th December 1981
until 1988. In the seventies during Edward Gierek’s period of openness to the
West the films were even supported by the Polish government.20
Since the second half of the fifties, after Dwight Eisenhower recognised
Poland as “the window in the Iron Curtain”21 the American embassy supported
the activities of the largest American foundations : the Rockefeller Foundation
and the Ford Foundation, in Poland. In 1956 the Fulbright program began work.
It had the task of spreading a positive image of America in Polish academic insti-
tutes. Thanks to the financial and organisational support of the USA, above all
the USIA, the first institute for American Studies in the Soviet Block was estab-
lished in 1976 in Poland. The basis for its establishment was the cooperation be-
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tween the Indiana University and the University of Warsaw. The aim was the fur-
ther development of the program for American studies in Poland.22
The incidents in 1968 had a totally different meaning in Eastern Europe and
in Western Europe. As in other Eastern European countries under Communist
rule, the Polish people did not oppose the “American Imperialism”, but rather
the “Soviet Empire”. In those days the fascination with America was consolidat-
ed because the “horizons of liberty” could be found there.23 Later, President
Reagan, and with him the USA as a whole, were seen as the liberators from the
Communist dictatorship and guides leading the way towards freedom and
democracy.24 In Polish political opinion it was not the Western European policy
of Détente and Eastern Policy ( Ostpolitik ) of the nineteen - seventies but Ronald
Reagan’s policy of confrontation that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet
system. During the nineteen - eighties the United States financially, politically and
morally supported the Polish Freedom Movement Solidarność ( Solidarity ).25
Former intellectual dissidents, such as Adam Michnik, recognised the American
“mission of democratisation” in the destruction of dictatorships. Thus in their
opinion because the United States helped to defeat Communism in the past they
can presently contribute to the fall of other totalitarian systems.26
After the end of the Cold War the United States of America became Poland’s
most important partner. The first non - Communist prime minister, Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, emphasised in a speech in September 1989 that Poland wanted to
develop a good relationship with America, in order to catch up as soon as possi-
ble with all the missed opportunities of the past. Since the beginning of the nine-
teen - nineties the USA has consistently been Poland’s first choice despite the
changes on the political scene. The new Polish president, Lech Kaczyński is con-
tinuing with the pro - American policy of his predecessor, Aleksander Kwaś -
niewski.27 Prime minister, Jarosław Kaczyński, insists that the deepening of
European Union identity may not lead to a confrontation with the USA.28
In Polish public opinion the anti - American position, which many Western
European countries adhere to, is perceived to be associated with Communism.
254 Aufsätze / Articles
22 Cf. Michałek, W poszukiwaniu nowej Kolchidy, p. 24.
23 Cf. Janusz A. Majcherek, Warschau – Washington : Warum lieben die Polen Amerika ?
In : DIALOG, 64 (2003), p. 23.
24 Pastusiak, Prezydenci amerykańscy, p. 250.
25 Cf. Michałek, W poszukiwaniu nowej Kolchidy, p. 25.
26 Cf. Jacques Rupnik, Amerikas beste Freunde in Europa. Die USA von Ostmitteleuropa
aus gesehen. In : Transit. Europäische Revue, 27 (2004), p. 29–52, here 34 and 38.
27 Cf. Justyna Zając, Rozwój stosunków polsko - amerykańskich po zimnej wojnie [ The
Development of the Polish - American Relations After the Cold War ]. In : La Musa
2006, forthcoming. Also see the analyses of Polish - American relations in the year-
books of the Polish Foreign Policy ( Rocznik Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej ), Warsaw
(Yearbooks 1991–2005).
28 Premier : Polska chce silnej UE [ Prime Minister : Poland Wishes for a Well Developed
EU ]. In : Gazeta Wyborcza, 8. September 2006, p. 4.
Anti - Americanism was a hallmark of the Communist propaganda. Thus this crit-
ical perspective does not earn much recognition among the Polish people.29
The idealisation of Polish - American historical relations contributes to the
Poles’ association of the USA with freedom, prosperity and security. Władysław
Bartoszewski, Poland’s former foreign minister, explains his country’s cordial at-
titude towards America by stating that the Americans have always regarded the
Poles as their allies and as such never fought against them : “One has to be total-
ly ignorant of politics and history not to understand, that the grandparents of to-
day’s American population decisively contributed to the recovery of Poland’s in-
dependence.”30
In this form, the idea of freedom in Poland has become very closely linked to
the idea of national independence. According to this idea of freedom, the United
States have always been viewed as a country that helped Poland on her journey
to freedom and independence.
Defence policy purposes
A primary motive for Poland’s strong support of American policy lies in defence
policy interests. Both sides of the Atlantic are dominated by diverging concep-
tions of foreign and defence policy : the “hard” policy of the United States, which
stands for an interventionist, military oriented course, and the “soft” policy of
the European Union, which cannot offer the same security guarantees the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation can give.31
Janusz Reiter, the Polish ambassador to the USA, observed that these two
conceptions collided over the issue of the Iraq conflict. Poland is not ready to re-
nounce the hard security granted by NATO in favour of the “soft” safety provid-
ed by the EU. According to many Polish politicians the USA can offer a clear line
and a “safe” defence concept.
The prevailing opinion is that one can rely on the United States should any-
thing happen to one’s country. Robert Kagan’s thesis, according to which the
tenets of a “soft” coexistence policy are difficult to implement in Europe, has
gained much support in Poland.32
In autumn 1992 Poland announced that she wanted to become a member of
the NATO. Warsaw sought Washington’s support in this venture. The USA has
continually provided this support since 1994. At the NATO summit in Madrid in
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July 1997 Poland along with the Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to ac-
cession negotiations. Poland had been a NATO member since 12th May 1999
and actively takes part in NATO operations. At present NATO plays a central
role in Polish Security Policy.33 Among the Polish population there has long been
much support for NATO. In 2002 64 % of the population supported NATO and
it was only in 2006 that support shrunk to 48 %.34
Historical fears also play an important role in sustaining the pro - American
stance. There is still a subconscious fear of neighbouring Russia. Talks held be-
tween France, Germany and Russia in recent years reminded the Polish public of
past political constellations, which leads Poland to fear being overrun by mighty
foreign interests. From the Polish perspective the support of US policy in Iraq
could have lead to a cooling down of the relations between the United States and
Russia.35
Among the European countries Poland is the most supportive of George W.
Bush’s political course. In 2004 his policies were supported by 12 % of the
French, 12 % of the Germans, 27 % of the British, 30 % of the Italians and 42 %
of the Poles.36 During the “Iraq Crisis” the Polish government fully supported
the American course. President Kwaśniewski proclaimed, “If it is President
Bush’s vision, it is mine”.37 At the time the majority of Polish politicians were of
the opinion that the Americans had helped Poland during the two world wars,
now it was Poland’s turn to return the favour. Many politicians feared that
should Poland refuse to take part in the intervention in Iraq, eventually America
would refuse to help Poland in the case of a threat. At the time, however, the pro-
Ameri can orientation of Polish foreign policy about the engagement in the Gulf
was a sort of insurance policy ( Police ), which was intended to protect Poland’s
security. Additionally Poland hoped that in connection to her involvement in the
War she would become America’s most important partner in the region.38
256 Aufsätze / Articles
33 Cf. Zając, Rozwój stosunków polsko - amerykańskich. See also : Ryszard Zięba, Polityka
w ramach NATO i wobec Unii Europejskiej [ The Politics within the Framework of
NATO and Regarding the European Union ]. In : Justyna Zając ( ed.), Polityka za-
graniczna USA po Zimnej Wojnie [ The Foreign Policy of the USA After the Cold War],
Toruń 2006, p. 33–66.
34 Cf. Transatlantic Trends. Key Findings 2006. http ://www.transatlantictrends.org /
doc/2006_TT_Key%20Findings%20FINAL.pdf (11.9.2006).
35 Cf. Kai - Olaf Lang, Trojanische Pferde der USA oder proeuropäische Atlantiker ? Die
neuen Mitglieder der EU und ihr Verhältnis zu Amerika, SWP - Study 2003/46, p. 5.
36 Cf. Mateusz Fałkowski, Postawy Polaków wobec Stanów Zjednoczonych,
Amerykanów i stosunków transatlantyckich [ The Attitudes of the Poles towards the
United States, the Americans and the Transatlantic Relationship ]. In : Kolarska -
Bobińska / Kucharczyk / Kaczyński ( ed.), Mosty przez Atlantyk, p. 35–56, here 54.
37 David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses : The Continent. To Some in Europe, The
Major Problem Is Bush the Cowboy. In : The New York Times, 24. January 2003.
38 Cf. Roman Kuźniar / Andrzej Szeptycki, Rola Stanów Zjednoczonych w polityce za-
granicznej III RP [ The Role of the United States in the Foreign Policy of the III
People’s Republic of Poland ]. In : Kolarska - Bobińska / Kucharczyk / Kaczyński ( ed.),
Mosty przez Atlantyk, p. 113–149, here 130–132.
Poland was also one of the few nations, which positively viewed George W.
Bush’s re - election; the Polish majority regarded it as a positively influence on
world peace and security.39 Many Poles see in him the successor to Ronald
Reagan, who still enjoys much popularity in Poland today.40
“Liberty” of the market and every day culture
The positive attitude towards a certain country is often connected to the fact that
one can identify with the values, traditions and lifestyles that are predominant
there. Are the existing socio - economic, political and religious models in the USA
similar to those of the Poles ? Do the Poles have similar outlook on life to the
Americans ? Do the majority of Poles identify themselves with the liberal mode
as the Americans do or do they empathise with welfare state, which is based on
state intervention and is prevalent in Western Europe ? Are the attitudes of the
Poles similar to those, which dominate the liberal American society or do the
Poles desire a European model ? The Poles are often of the opinion that if a sys-
tem of society and economy functions one hundred percent then it is the
American model.41 However, do the Poles know how the American model func-
tions or is it a type of myth ?
The choice of a socio - economic model is connected to the attitude towards so-
cial inequalities. In Poland one can observe a strong trend towards the free mar-
ket. The increase in inequalities during the course of the nineties in Poland lead
to the renunciation of the neo - liberal value system. The need for equality is much
more wide - spread in Poland than in the USA. While 71 % of Americans prefer
freedom, only 55 % of Poles believe that freedom is more important than equali-
ty. Here the values in Poland are similar to those of pre - enlargement EU. A great
difference is found in relationship to the conviction that the government should
remove existing inequalities. While 62 % of Poles desire state intervention in this
case, only 19 % of the Americans share this opinion. 
In the nineteen - nineties as Central and Eastern Europe was still in the process
of transformation, a big difference between the personal preferences of the Poles
and the US - American citizens could be deducted. To a much further extent than
the US citizens the Poles supported the preservation of order. Rising prices both-
ered the Poles much more than the US - Americans. Freedom of speech signifi-
cantly played a more important role in the USA than in Poland.
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Figure 1 : Personal Preferences
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Source : World Value Survey
The US citizens also desired more personal responsibility than the Poles ( see fig-
ure 2). The Poles’ wish for more personal responsibility remained just as strong
at the beginning and at the end of the transformation phase.
Figure 2 : Personal Responsibility
Source : World Value Survey
This development only slightly changed in the further course of the transforma-
tion. An international comparative study carried out in 200042 showed that the
42 World Value Survey, 2000.
Polish public opinion strongly supported economic state interventionism, indeed
to a much greater extent than the population of the fifteen EU member states
(prior to the 2004 enlargement ). The Poles more often wish for a higher degree
of state control for privately owned firms and are less ready to grant them free-
dom than the inhabitants of the “old” EU are. In almost all EU countries the ma-
jority of those questioned supported loosening state control of the economy. In
Poland, it was the opposite. 56 % of Poles believed that the state should more
strictly control firms. Only 22 % of Poles agreed that the state should allow busi-
nesses more freedom. The Americans were more convinced than the Poles that
the remuneration should be dependant on the quality of the work, position of re-
sponsibility and how hard one works. The majority of Poles in this respect had
an egalitarian opinion.43
Competition on the labour market was also less accepted in Poland than in
the USA. The statement “Competition is a good thing. It motivates people to
work better and have new ideas” was positively answered by 71 % of the Ameri -
cans and 59 % of the Poles. In the pre - 2004 European Union 58 % of the respon-
dents answered “yes” to this question.
The US citizens believed more in the importance of democracy than the Poles
did. In 1999 the majority of Americans found the existing democracy “very
good”, while the Poles generally found it “fairly good”. It is significant that this
development in the USA remains stable. 
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Figure 3 : Having a democratic political system is ...
Source : World Value Survey
In Poland the belief in the positive effects of democracy on the economy was al-
so much less common. While in both Western Europe and the United States a
clear majority of those questioned ( two thirds ) felt a democratic economy works
well, only half of the Polish respondents shared this opinion.44
Nevertheless, freedom of speech is currently very important for Poles. To the
question on the impact of the freedom movement Solidarność more than 50 % of
the respondents answered that the most important thing, which this movement
achieved, was freedom of speech.45
On the question of religiosity the Americans and Poles show marked similari-
ties. 95 % of Poles declared that they believed in God, in the USA the figure was
92 % of the population. While in the old EU 17 % of those questioned agreed
with the statement that no religion held much truth, in both America and Poland
only 4 % agreed with this statement. Americans and Poles trust the Church and
Church organisations to a much greater extent than the citizens of the old EU.
The statement that religion causes conflict rather than peace and that highly reli-
gious people are often intolerant was generally accepted in the old EU and re-
ceived confirmation to a much less extent in Poland and the USA. The religiosity
of the Poles and the Americans is marked by a much more traditional position on
marriage, sexual activity and abortion than in West Europe. In contrast to the
West Europeans the Poles and Americans only seldom believe marriage is an
out- dated institution and are very critical of couples living together before mar-
riage.46
Parallels to the Czech Republic ?
Is it possible to compare the strong resemblance in Poland to America to the de-
velopments in other East Central Europe countries ? In the following sections
Poland’s neighbouring country, the Czech Republic, will be considered.
In contrast to Poland the fear of Russia is not so wide spread in the Czech
Republic. This leads to a certain difference in her relationship with the USA.
According to a survey from November 2004, 87 % of the Czechs found the role
of the Soviet Army in liberating Europe important. In contrast 83 % of the
Czechs regarded the role of the United States as important.47
The support for the United States is lower in the Czech Republic than in
Poland. In relation to political and economic co - operation the USA only ranks at
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place five on the Czech list, behind Slovakia, Germany, Poland and Austria.48
The differentiation between the desire for political connection to the USA and
the economic co - operation with the EU, which is noticeable in Poland, is not
present in the Czech Republic. The USA appear neither politically nor economi-
cally as important for the Czech Republic as her direct neighbours do. According
to the Czech public opinion institute, STEM, which carried out a representative
survey in December 2002, 75 % of the Czech population supported the coordi-
nation of Czech politics with the European Union. The importance of the coordi-
nation of the Czech politics with that of the USA was only valued by 37 % of the
Czechs. More than 50 % of the Czech population were of the opinion that the
Czech politic was correctly organised because it is organised differently to
American politics.49
The majority of the Czechs (59 %) supported the EU’s foreign policy towards
third states. The support for the military intervention in Iraq was much lower in
the Czech Republic than in Poland. In February 2003 67 % of the Czech popula-
tion categorically rejected a military attack on Iraq and 76 % were against a mili-
tary operation in Iraq without a UN mandate.50 In March 2003 the proportion
of war opponents had increased even more to 72 %. The number of war advo-
cates only counted for 21 %. At this point many anti war demonstrations were al-
so being held in the Czech Republic.51 57 % of the Czechs felt that the toppling
of Saddam Hussein would not help improve world security.52
The public opinion of the Czechs on the Iraq conflict was in accordance with
the position of the Czech politicians, as in comparison to Poland they were more
reserved war advocates and more ambivalent. The former Czech President,
Václav Havel, who supported the Gulf War, however expressed doubts, whether
the timing and the course were right.53 The President at that time, Václav Klaus,
categorically rejected it. Against the backdrop of these facts it was easier for the
Czechs to categorically turn against the war than for the Poles, whose President,
Prime Minister as well as the foreign minister supported the USA’s actions.
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America – a Polish dream (“Freedom” or “Liberty”)
Poland has a long tradition of “freedom”, which is linked to her historical devel-
opment and to the fact that for many centuries the country was not free. In the
public opinion the gaining of freedom is connected to the assistance of the
United States. This is closely linked to myths, which are a product of the idealisa-
tion of the USA. For example US President Woodrow Wilson is commonly seen
as a great friend of Poland in Polish historiography. The fact that Wilson did not
have any specific sympathy for Poland until he became president is seldom ad-
dressed. In his 1902 published book : A History of the American People, he de-
scribed the Poles as people “without qualifications, energy, initiative or intelli-
gence”.54 Wilson wanted to reduce the numbers of Polish immigrants to the
United States. Ten years later, already a presidency candidate, he renounced to
his previous opinion in order to win the vote of Polish immigrants. Nevertheless,
after his electoral victory of 1916 his remarks on the Polish immigrants were
reprinted in the second edition of his book, even though Polish organisations in-
sisted that he withdraw them.55 It is often wilfully forgotten that Franklin D.
Roosevelt proved himself to be disloyal towards Poland at the Conferences of
Tehran and Yalta because he did not make a pledge on behalf of the USA guaran-
teeing Polish borders. During the negotiations in Yalta (4th–11th February 1945)
Roosevelt voiced that for over 500 years Poland has been the source of numer-
ous problems. In his letter to Stalin on the 6th February 1945 he emphasised that
the USA would never help a provisional government in Poland, which represents
other interests than those of the Soviet Union.56 The position of the United
States, which was adopted by state secretary James Byrnes in 1946 and state sec-
retary George Marshall in 1947, was also unfavourable. In 1950 the USA sup-
ported the position that the Western border of Poland was a provisional border.
They avoided commenting on the Eastern border because that did not concern
solving the problems of hostile states. Therefore, Washington did not recognise
Poland’s Western border, however, it did not question the eastern border.57 In a
telegram on 28th April 1953 the American embassy informed that Poland was in
no position to restore the war damages in the western regions. Neither the Polish
government nor the citizens would invest in this region. The conclusion was that
the Poles clearly did not reckon that they would ever be permanently able to keep
the region. The telegram was signed by the councillor of the United States, Loyd
V. Steere. Another telegram dating 26th May 1953 reported of the fiasco of the
settlement campaign in the Western territories.58
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The picture that the Poles have of the USA today is also influenced by myths.
The Poles describe the USA as “the country of unlimited freedom”, where one
can renounce the limitations imposed by one’s origins and traditions. The Polish
perception of the United States is based on the American popular culture, of
which the strongest influence is Hollywood - made movies and advertisement and
which insufficiently reflects the real - life American society.59
If the Poles were to realise that the social constraints in the USA are just as
strong as those existing in Poland, this would change their impression of the
USA. The USA is attractive for Poles because of its difference to Poland, not be-
cause of any possible similarity to it.
This mythical impression of the USA has not led to the construction of an
“American” socio - political model in Poland. The economy of the United States is
very different to the Polish economy, as are the expectations, which both systems
are confronted with.60 It can definitely be said that in fact the concept of “liber-
ty” is not as important to the Polish people as is often proclaimed. The Polish so-
ciety is much more strongly oriented towards the historically bound concept of
“freedom”. 
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